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Introduction
This article will examine employee participation in Austrian industry as
codified in Austria's new Labor Code' which became effective on July 1,
1976. Employee participation in Austria is based on a system of "codeter-
mination" 2 which, in turn, has its theoretical roots in a "social partnership"
between the relevant economic interests, a social partnership that reflects the
historical, social and institutional framework unique to Austria.
Social partnership in Austria is closely related to the operation of Austria's
wage and price policy. This policy should be of particular interest to Ameri-
can readers because it is based on a system of voluntary controls and because
it has been an impressively successful system. The complex historical, social
and political processes that have shaped that system are not central to this
article, but where the details are relevant, they will be discussed.
I. Codetermination in General
Before analyzing the details of codetermination as it is currently practiced
in Austria, the general principles of codetermination should be outlined.3
*Ms. Traub practices law in Salt Lake City.
'The provisions of the Austrian Labor Code (Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz) (1976) are cited:
ArbVG.
2" Codetermination" is a term without exact definition. In German it is Mitbestimmung,
which is a theoretical concept of shared decision making. Schoenbaum and Lieser, in Reform of
the Structure of theAmerican Corporation & The "Two- Tier" Boardmodel, 62 Ky. L.J. 91, 100
n. 54 (1976) state:
It is unfortunate that the concrete and dynamic German word "Mitbestimmung" is translated
into English by use of the abstract and static word "codetermination." Mitbestimmung in
German carries the connotation of active participation in the process of decisionmaking; this
is absent from the English term.
'The form that codetermination takes in Germany is the one that is most widely known, and in
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Typically, codetermination has the following elements:
1. A theoretical and political development which allows corporate deci-
sion-making to be shared by employees and employers.
2. A corporate management structure which is divided into two Boards: a
Management Board whose function is the everyday running of the
Company (similar to the officers of an American company); and a Su-
pervisory Board whose functions correspond roughly to those of an
American Board of Directors.
3. The selection by employees of their representatives to sit on the Supervi-
sory Board. In Germany (whose codetermination system is the one most
familiar to American readers and businessmen) employee representa-
tives constitute 50 percent of the Supervisory Board, but such represen-
tation is limited to a relatively narrow range of corporations. In Aus-
tria, almost all business entities are included, but employees'
representatives are limited to one-third of the Supervisory Board's
members. As will be seen, the Austrian system incorporates one other
significant feature, i.e., employees' representatives are selected through
each plant and the union is not formally involved. In Germany, on the
other hand, employee representatives may be selected only by the union
and may (and frequently do) come from outside the plant.
Ii. Codetermination in Austria
In Austria, codetermination means more than just having employees' rep-
resentatives on a company's board of directors. It is a system of total integra-
tion of all social and economic interests and is more appropriately known as
"social partnership"." This partnership will be examined in some detail, but
it should be noted here that the overall result has been "that the organisations
representing the economic partners are integrated to a considerable extent in
the whole process of national policy formulation."I In other words, codeter-
mination in Austria is only one part of a program which involves the various
economic interests and allows employees significant input at every level of
decision making. The remarkable feature of this program is the degree and
spirit of cooperativeness with which it is carried out, a cooperativeness that
has been noted by virtually every writer who has examined the Austrian sys-
tem.'
In order to provide a context for understanding the operation of the Labor
Code, some examination of Austria's institutional framework is in order. In
some ways it has provided the model for the Austrian system. However, Austria has modified the
legal and structural basis of its system in important ways. Therefore, it is important to under-
stand that the resulting system is quite different in Austria from what it is in Germany.
'AUSTRIAN FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, THE RATIONAL APPROACH TO LABOUR AND INDUSTRY 17.
'Id. at 18.
'See e.g., text infra at 28-29.
Codetermination and the New Austrian Labor Code
Austria, a network of organizations share in national economic planning;
their participation is integrated with the conventional governmental and po-
litical institutions. Thus, there is legal machinery provided for a close coor-
dination between the highest executive level of government, the related minis-
tries (e.g., finance, trade, interior, social welfare), those organizations in
which membership is compulsory (e.g., the Chambers of Labor and Com-
merce), and those in which membership is voluntary (e.g., the Trade Union
Federation and the Federation of Austrian Industry).7
There is one other important ingredient of the Austrian economic scene
which should be noted here. Since the end of World War II, a significant
portion of Austrian industry has been nationalized, and Austria's social
partnership cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of this
fact. By means of a national holding company (the OIAG)' and in combina-
tion with the Ministries of Finance, of Trade, and of Transport, the govern-
ment holds controlling shares9 in the steel and non-ferrous metals industries,
and in the electrical industry (both generation of electricity'" and electrical
products) as well as in the automotive, chemical and coal industries.'' In
addition, the three main banks are nationalized directly under the OIAG and
therefore, through the holdings of these banks, nationalization extends in-
directly into many levels of the Austrian economy.
Of the almost 650,000 people working in Austrian industry, some 110,000
are employed directly by nationalized industry (OTAG subsidiaries).' 2
Further, while estimates vary as to the extent of employment, productivity
and capital investment in those industries which are indirectly controlled
through the nationalized banks, some estimates range as high as an addi-
tional fifty percent. 3
Thus it is clear that the government, acting as a shareholder, has an exten-
sive and direct impact on the operations of Austrian industry. The internal
board structure of the OIAG duplicates that of the individual companies, and
therefore, the role of employees' representatives is magnified in those nego-
tiations which take place in the nationalized industries.
'Suppanz, The Institutional Framework in PRICES AND INCOMES POLICY, THE AUSTRIAN EXPE-
RIENCE, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 9 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Suppanz].
IOsterreichische Industrieverwaltungs A ktiengesellschaft.
'There is an important distinction to be made between the technique of nationalization by
which the OIAG holds shares in companies and the more conventional mechanism by which the
railways, postal and communications industries for example, are nationalized. The latter are
public bodies (Bundesbetriebe) and are more or less integrated into the public administration.
Their employees are civil servants.
"The generation of electricity is done by nationalized industries, owned jointly by the govern-
ment and the provinces. The distribution of electricity is handled by nine provincially owned
companies, one in each of the nine provinces.
"This list is not exhaustive, but does indicate the areas of major government holdings. To
various extents, government interests extend also to the oil industry, (production and refining),
transport and mining (other than coal).
'Interview with Oskar Grtinwald, Director, 6LAG, in Vienna (May 1978).
'"Suppanz, supra note 7 at 11.
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A. The Institutional Framework
1. POLITICAL PARTIES
From the end of World War II until 1966, Austria had a coalition govern-
ment formed by the Socialist Party of Austria (SPO) and the Austrian
People's Party (OVP). These two parties still represent eighty to ninety per-
cent of the total electorate, although the Socialist Party today, by a close
majority, dominates the government."
The SPO draws its support mainly from employees.' 5 Officials of the labor
organizations are, for the most part, members of the SPO and play an impor-
tant part in the Socialist Party.
The OVP derives its primary support from employers and from the rural
farm population. What support it has among employees comes mainly from
civil servants and salary earners in private industry.
The origin of the coalition government which followed World War II was
crucial to the development of social partnership in Austria. Between the two
World Wars the social classes and the political parties which represented
them were bitterly hostile, and in 1934 civil war broke out. However, follow-
ing the Anschluss in 1938, which placed Austria under German domination,
leaders of the middle class democratic parties and of the workers' movement
were imprisoned together in the same concentration camps. Out of that
shared experience grew the decision to make a cooperative and productive
effort to put aside old hostilities, to end as quickly as possible the postwar
occupation by the Allies and to work together to create an effective govern-
ment. I6 The lessons learned from these experiences still seem to be effective
and the apparent consensus is that this cooperative trend will persist into
future generations.
2. VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
The Federation of Austrian Industrialists (VOI)'" and the Trade Union
Federation (0GB)" are the two most significant voluntary organizations in
terms of size of membership, participation in economic planning and repre-
sentation of special interests.
The Federation of Austrian Industry is a powerful interest group whose
membership is comprised of employers at every level of the economy. About
85 percent of all workers are employed by members of the Federation.' 9
1'Since the special election in October 1971, called by the Socialists, ninety-three seats in the
Parliament have been held by the Socialist Party. Eighty seats have been held by the People's
Party, and the Freedom Party (a small right wing party) has held ten. The Communist Party has
none. This seat distribution was maintained by the election of 1975. UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: AUSTRIA 4 (1976).
"Austrian law and custom divide "employees" into "wage earners" and salary earners," a
distinction which is similar to that of "blue collar" and "white collar" workers.
1
6AusTRIAN FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, THE RATIONAL APPROACH TO LABOUR AND INDUSTRY, 2.
1' Vereinigung Osterreichischer Industrieller.
"Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund.
"Suppanz, supra note 7 at 10.
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Thomas Oliva, a representative of the Federation, explained the historical
context of this organization:
We correspond roughly to your National Association of Manufacturers, but the
correspondence is not entirely exact. You must never forget that we have been a
corporate state for some time, and we still are. This is a historical phenomemon. In
the thirties, the country was run more or less not according to political parties but by
the different groups of society, so we have a strong development of pressure groups
in the largest sense-strong labor unions, strong farmers' unions and a strong
league of industrialists.
We [The Federation] are legally empowered to be partners in the collective bargain-
ing process, but by our agreements with the Chamber of Commerce we delegated
our right to them; we don't exercise it. But we are legally entitled to negotiate for
industry [Kollektivvertragsfahig] by Section 4.20 We are not specifically named
there, but the clauses are applicable to us.2'
The Trade Union Federation is a voluntary organization composed of six-
teen unions subdivided mainly by groups of industries22 and is
• . . further subdivided by region and trade down to plant level, but the Trade
Union Headquarters are responsible for administration and financial control. Only
one of the sixteen of its member Unions, the Private Employees' Union, covers all
sectors of the economy (with the exception of the civil service and the liberal profes-
sions). 3
Membership covers roughly sixty-five percent of all workers (about 1.5
million members). Just as the Federation of Austrian Industry is closely asso-
ciated with the Conservative Party and the Chamber of Commerce, the Trade
Union Federation has close ties to the Socialist Party and the Chamber of
Labor.
"ArbVG Section 4 provides:
(1) Those who may bargain collectively are the legal representatives of employers' and
employees' interests who directly or indirectly have the responsibility for regulating
working conditions and whose autonomy in representing employer or employee in-
terests against each other is independent.
(2) Those who may bargain collectively are the professional employer and employee asso-
ciations which have a voluntary membership and which:
I. make it their task, according to statute, to regulate working conditions within their
area of influence (Wirkungsbereiches);
2. in the course of representing the interests of employers or employees become active
in the direction of technical and physical expansion;
3. by reason of the number of members and the extent of activity, have a substantial
economic significance;
4. in their representation of the interests of the employer and employee against the
opposite side, are independent.
(3) With respect to labor contracts with associations which, because of their membership
number, the extent of their activity, and the number of their employees, have a substan-
tial influence, these may themselves bargain collectively provided that, with regard to
labor contracts with certain firms and administration they do not belong to a collective
bargaining entity of employers.
"Interview with Thomas Oliva, a representative of the Federation of Austrian Industry, in
Vienna (June 1976).
"Suppanz, supra note 7 at 11.
23/d.
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On the employees' side, almost all collective agreements are concluded by
the Trade Union Federation. "Wage negotiations can also be conducted by
subordinate trade union bodies, but agreements must be signed by the appro-
priate trade union as the bodies duly authorized by the Federation." 2  Thus,
a high degree of centralized control is maintained by the Trade Union Federa-
tion.
3. COMPULSORY ORGANIZATIONS
In Austria, employers and employees join the Federation of Austrian In-
dustry and the Trade Union Federation on a voluntary basis. On the other
hand, membership in the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Labor
is compulsory.
The Chamber of Commerce2" is the principal representative of industry in
collective bargaining. Its membership is defined legally as "all physical and
legal persons authorized to operate an independent enterprise in commerce
(foreign or domestic), industry, finance, credit or insurance." '26 The Cham-
bers are organized along provincial lines27 but a federal Chamber of Com-
merce oversees them all. At both the provincial and federal levels, the Cham-
bers are divided into sections for banking and insurance, tourism, trade,
transportation, manufacturing and small business. Officials are elected by
secret voting in each province and thus, through an indirect system of repre-
sentation, to the federal Chamber. Lists of candidates are proposed by em-
ployers' organizations which for the most part are closely aligned with the
People's (Conservative) Party, so the majority of members in all official
bodies of the Chamber of Commerce, at both provincial and federal levels,
are members of that party.2
In a second role, the Chamber of Commerce provides for close communi-
cation and flow of information between policy-makers and individual entre-
preneurs and industries. Further, it has specific governmental functions; for
example, foreign trade is run by the foreign branch of the Chamber of Com-
merce rather than by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
29
Membership in the Chamber of Labor30 is compulsory for wage earners
24/d.
2"The Austrian title for this Chamber is Bundeskammerfur Handel und Wirtschaft which is
variously translated as "Chamber of the Economy" and as "Chamber for Trade and Industry."
In interviews in English it was always called the "Chamber of Commerce," and that term has
been used here because of its common usage by Austrian informants. The American reader
should, however, be aware of the very different nature of a "Chamber" in Austria, where it has
legal and governmental significance.
"AUSTRIAN FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, THE RATIONAL APPROACH TO LABOUR AND INDUSTRY, 6.
"The nine provinces of Austria are: Wien (Vienna); Kirnten (Corinthia); Styria; Burgenland;
Nieder Osterreich (Lower Austria); Ober Osterreich (Upper Austria); Arlberg; Tirol (Tyrol);
and Salzburg.
" AusTRIAN PRESS SERVICE, NEW LABOUR CODE, 6 (1974).
29Proksch, The Austrian Joint Wage and Price Council, 83 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW
231.
"The official title is KammerfilrArbeiter undAngestellte which is translated as "Chamber of
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and salaried employees. There is no federal chamber, but there is a Chamber
of Labor for each of the nine provinces, and the Chamber of Labor for the
Province of Vienna represents the others in contacts with the federal govern-
ment. Each provincial Chamber is organized into sections representing wage
earners, salary earners and public employees. 3'
Unlike its counterpart Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Labor
plays only a small role in collective bargaining,32 its main functions being
educational and legal. Thus, it offers to workers training programs and legal
advice, but it does not represent them in court action. This latter practice is
not prohibited by law but is followed as a matter of policy. The Chamber of
Labor serves as a major information and legislative action force. It negotiates
extensively at the legislative level.33
The Chamber of Labor is unique in Europe. No other country has such a formal-
ized, legalized, institutionalized interest group representing employees. The unique
thing in Austria is this legally established, self-administering, complete infra-struc-
ture of professionals.
As the membership of the Chambers is compulsory, they have to find a compromise
between the interests of their members. In addition to the representation of the
interests of their members, the Chambers also exercise certain central government
functions, e.g., they are members of the official Price Commission; they have the
right to criticize draft legislation and regulations; and they sit on a large number of
advisory boards.3"
4. THE PARITY COMMISSION
Thus far we have been dealing with those organizations which are legally
empowered to function as interest groups within the Austrian economic and
political system. In addition, a unique and interesting feature of Austria's
system of economic planning is the role played by the Parity Commission.33
This commission is an extra-legal body, not founded on any legislative act; it
was formally approved by cabinet resolution in 1957, having been born out of
an exchange of letters between Julius Raab, then president of the Chamber of
Commerce and the then-president of the Trade Union Federation, Johann
Bohm."
In theory, the commission's function is to combat inflation and "to evolve
the joint national policy." 3 Toward those ends it brings together the repre-
Wage Earners and Salaried Employees" and as "Chamber of Workers". The term "Chamber of
Labor" will be used here.
"Suppanz, supra note 7 at 10.
"Austrian law gives the Chamber of Labor the right to bargain collectively, but the Chamber
does not assert that right. Suppanz, supra note 7 at 10.
33d.
"Interview with Raoul Kneucker, Rector of the College of Law of the University of Vienna, in
Vienna (June 1976).
"Suppanz, supra note 7 at 10.
"1AUSTRIAN FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, THE RATIONAL APPROACH TO LABOUR AND INDUSTRY,
H1.
"Earlier efforts to create an Economic Directorate (composed of members of the government
and the four major economic bodies, and the President of the National Bank) failed because the
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sentatives of the appropriate organizations to deal with all major economic
planning, wage and price questions, and allows the interested parties to share
information and perspectives. Further, it allows the introduction of scientific
data into the planning and decision-making process.38 Since the Commission
has no legal foundation, its membership is voluntary, and its decisions are
not legally binding. However, the point is repeatedly made that the decisions
of the Parity Commission are de facto binding, and parties cannot effectively
ignore them without triggering the pressure, albeit unofficial, of other gov-
ernment bodies. 9 To date, no decision of the Parity Commission has been
challenged legally.4 0
The Parity Commission generally meets monthly. The federal Chancellor,
or in his absence, the Minister of the Interior, serves as chairman. Two repre-
sentatives from each of four interest groups (the Trade Union Federation, the
Chamber of Agriculture, the Chamber of Labor and the Chamber of Com-
merce) are present, along with experts that serve as advisors. The same indi-
viduals also meet every three months for a "fundamental review" session
when they are joined by the president and vice-president of the National Bank
and by the director of the Austrian Institute for Economic Research. The
Parity Commission deals with urgent economic problems at special sessions
which are attended by additional representatives. Special sessions were held
to discuss, for example, the revaluation of the Austrian schilling and the
introduction of economic stabilization measures in November 1972.
Before negotiations of collective wage agreements begin, the individual
union, via the Trade Union Federation, makes application to the Parity
Commission's Subcommittee for Wages. The subcommittee is made up of
representatives of employers and employees and is chaired alternately by the
Chamber of Commerce and by the Trade Union Federation. Without the
approval of this subcommittee, the union will not proceed.
Without exception, the unions accept the procedure as binding and negotiations on
a new collective agreement are never held without the consent of the Parity Com-
mission."
The Subcommittee for Prices consists of representatives of the four group
interest organizations, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Inte-
rior, with the chairmanship taken by a representative of the Federal Chamber
Court for the Protection of the Constitution ruled that such a body would be incompatible with
ministerial responsibility. Suppanz, supra note 7 at 11. For an extensive history of the Parity
Commission, see M. EDELMAN, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(1954).
"H. KOTRNOCH & W. SCHOENSTEIN, FOREIGN INCOME PORTFOLIOS: BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN
AUSTRIA, A-13 (Tax Management Portfolio No. 222-4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as KOTRNOCH &
SCHOENSTEIN].
"The author was assured by several sources that if a legal challenge to a commission decision
were presented to the Supreme Court, it would be dismissed.
"Suppanz, supra note 7 at 21.
"AUSTRIAN FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, THE RATIONAL APPROACH TO LABOUR AND INDUSTRY 11.
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of Commerce. The principal role of the Subcommittee for Prices is to ensure
that unavoidable price increases are distributed evenly (in terms of both ex-
tent and timing) and to keep the price front calm by preventing any group
from exploiting a particular market situation.' 2 The employers' organiza-
tions have undertaken that their members will increase their prices only if the
increases have been approved by the Parity Commission.
In addition to the Subcommittee for Wages and the Subcommittee for
Prices, the Parity Commission uses an Advisory Committee for Economic
and Social Questions. The primary purpose of this committee is to provide
economic planning on a scientific and objective basis. Toward this end, it
conducts studies into specific economic questions and makes appropriate
recommendations. These recommendations must, before publication, be ap-
proved by the presidents of the group interest organizations."'
It is through the Parity Commission that all the organizations discussed
above are made to work together within an extra-legal structure that so far
has been, politically and economically, highly effective.
B. The Works Councils
The institutional structure of the Austrian economy as it has been dis-
cussed thus far presents some unique features, but essentially what has been
described is a system of labor management relations that is highly integrated
with a system of national policy formulation that operates from the top level
down, with some input flowing in the opposite direction. A second separate
system of worker participation also exists, though-the works council sys-
tem. It is through the works councils that Austrian law provides for a sepa-
rate stream of worker representation. The system is codified by the new La-
bor Code (Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz) which became effective July 1, 1976,"
and it is this system which is reflected in the term "codetermination."
1. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Under the Code, any firm which employs five or more people must elect a
worker representative,' 5 and if the firm employs a minimum of five wage
earners and five salary earners, each group may select a representative.' 6 It is
also possible to elect joint representatives to form a joint committee on which
either wage or salary earners may serve." In larger firms, the election of more
than one worker representative results in the formation of a works council."1
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with nine or fewer employees, one representative; for nineteen employees,
two representatives; for 19-50 employees, three representatives; one addi-
tional representative for each additional one hundred employees. If more
than a thousand people are employed by a firm, an additional representative
is allowed for each five hundred employees.49
Representatives are elected for three year terms"0 by a secret, written bal-
lot.' Candidates may be independent, or they may be representatives of a
subsection of the union; 2 but it is unusual for unions to nominate candi-
dates." In some cases, the works council may request that any or all of its
members be released from work with pay. This may be granted for one mem-
ber in firms with more than 150 employees, for two in firms of over 700, and
three for over 3,000, with an additional member allowed off for each addi-
tional three thousand workers. The law provides that representatives thus
released from work to safeguard the interests of their fellow employees must
not suffer any disadvantage as to payment or promotion. 4
During the course of a three year term of office, a representative may
request release from work in order to attend training courses for up to two
weeks, and if the firm employs more than twenty employees, such a repre-
sentative will receive full pay. 5 If the firm employs more than 200 people,
release may be for up to a year, but without pay.56
These arrangements are designed to ensure that the workers' representative has the
opportunity to acquire the kind of knowledge which will enable him to carry out his
responsibilities. Labour organisations provide a wide range of training courses de-
signed to meet his need. 7
The council elects a chairman from among its members, and he represents
the council in negotiations with outside parties and calls meetings of the
council at least monthly. Generally, in larger firms, the chairman is a repre-
sentative who has been released from work."
Welfare and training programs for employees and their families may be
established by the works council, and in many cases contribution to such
programs is, by individual agreement, made by employers. The law also gives
to works councils the right to participate in any such programs maintained by
the firm. 9
The rights of the works councils with respect to certain social, economic





"FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, NEW LABOUR CODE 10 (1974).
'ArbVG § 117.
"ArbVG §§ Ill, 118.
'
6ArbVG § 119.
"FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, NEW LABOUR CODE 12 (1974).
"Id.
"Id. at 13.
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ensure that collective agreements are observed, and therefore, they have the
right to inspect wage and salary lists; if personal files are kept, and the em-
ployer consents, the council may consult these also."'
The employer must keep the works council informed on any matters con-
cerning employees' economic, social, health or cultural interests, and four
times a year he must meet with the council to discuss current matters, general
principles concerning personnel or social, economic or technological aspects
of management and labor-management relations, and any major company
issues. These meetings may be held every month if the employer wishes.6 '
The agreement of the works council is mandatory on any employer
measure concerning a disciplinary code, a filing of personal information (be-
yond that required to establish employment qualifications), any supervisory
measures which might violate "human dignity" 62 and any piecework systems
not already established by the collective agreement.
As to personnel policy, the employer has a duty to inform the works coun-
cil 3 and, if the council requests, to consult with it concerning any measures
involving career planning, the hiring of new employees and allocation of
work accommodations, and plans concerning any form of promotion." ' The




In the matter of dismissal:
[t] he works council enjoys a particularly strong position in the event of an employee
being given notice. The employer has to give the council prior warning of his inten-
tion and the workers' representatives then have a certain period within which they
can lodge a protest with the Conciliation Board, an independent arbitration body
designed to settle labour disputes.
The council's protest is accepted if it is found that an employee is to be dismissed
because of his activities with either the trade union or the works council or that the
dismissal is socially unjustifiable
In view of the rights of the works council in connection with dismissals, it is usual
for the employer to contact the council at an early stage and to discuss the issue
thoroughly. Special attention is paid to possible ways of minimising social hardship
arising from measures which are not to be avoided .... The strict legal provisions
concerning dismissal, combined with the sense of responsibility felt by Austrian
employers for the security of their workers' jobs have meant that major cuts in
personnel occur only occasionally.6 6
Austrian law gives the works council the right to participate in the firm's
economic policy planning and to be provided by the employer with appropri-
"ArbVG § 89.
"ArbVG § 92.
""Human dignity" is a concept similar in Austrian law to the "right of privacy" under




66FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, NEW LABOUR CODE 14-15 (1974).
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ate information concerning sales, production and investments.67 In medium
and large firms the right to be informed extends to financial statements and
information concerning structural changes including restrictions on or total
discontinuance of the firm's activities, mergers, major production changes,
new technology, major rationalization or automation measures, and changes
in the firm's ownership or legal status. In firms employing more than twenty
persons, such arrangements may be made subject to agreement. "The works
council may present proposals designed to lessen the harmful consequences
of such developments for the workers, but its representatives also have to
take into account the economic necessities facing the management."
68
The new Labor Code makes certain provisions to protect works council
representatives from arbitrary dismissal, requiring approval by the Concilia-
tion Board which may consent only if it finds that the representative is no
longer capable of doing his job, persistently neglects his job, or if it finds that
changes in the firm's structure have eliminated the representative's job, and
he cannot be placed in any other capacity.69 In the case of staff cuts, the
workers' representative is the last to go."0
The Code further provides' for the rights of both employers' and workers'
representatives to demand agreement on the following matters:
1. general rules concerning the conduct of employees on the firm's prem-
ises;
2. fixed working times, including the length and timing of breaks and the
distribution of working hours throughout the week;
3. the method of payment, in particular the place and time;
4. the nature and extent of the works council's participation in the ad-
ministration of training or social services run by the firm; and
5. measures to ensure that facilities or funds belonging to the firm are used
in a mutually acceptable manner.72
If negotiations do not lead to agreement, either side may refer the matter to
an arbitration board made up of equal numbers of employers' and employ-
ees' representatives. 3
6'ArbVG § 108.
61FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, NEW LABOUR CODE 16 (1974).
69ArbVG § 121.
"FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, NEW LABOUR CODE 17 (1974).
"ArbVG § 97(1) (1-6).
"In addition, another group of matters on which agreement may be voluntarily reached and
then made binding includes:
(1) guidelines for workers' housing owned by the firm;
(2) measures to ensure that working conditions in no way offend human dignity (Cf. note 62
supra; "human dignity" as it is used here has an apparently broader meaning);
(3) a suggestions system;
(4) a profit-sharing system;
(5) pensions and severance pay;
(6) a complaints service.
"ArbVG § 97.
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The Labor Code does not regulate voluntary agreements, but in principle
the employer and the works council may negotiate concerning individual
work contracts, which generally affect wage arrangements and frequently fix
a higher wage scale than that provided for in the collective agreement or
provide for additional payments over the actual wage.
In firms with more than two hundred employees, the works council can raise an
objection with the employer about any changes in the running of the firm which
may have an adverse effect on the employees. This may lead ... to a closure of a
firm being delayed for four weeks. If direct negotiations between workers' repre-
sentatives and management lead to no agreement on the planned measures, then a
conciliation board may be called in. The board can only make a binding decision
... if both conflicting parties agree beforehand to accept its decision.
In firms with more than four hundred workers a further appeal can be made, if the
conciliation board's efforts come to nothing, via the Austrian Trade Union Federa-
tion, to the State Economic Commission, which consists of the federal government
as well as representatives of employees and employers. Their task too is to attempt
to mediate between the conflicting parties and to suggest ways towards an agree-
ment. If agreement still cannot be reached, the employer has to provide the commis-
sion with all details related to the matter at hand. The commission then draws up a
report on whether or not the employees' original objection was justified."
2. CODETERMINATION: EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION ON THE
SUPERVISORY BOARD
For joint stock companies, 5 irrespective of the number of people em-
ployed, Austrian Corporation Law provides for a two-tier system of
boards: a Management Board and a Supervisory Board.' 6 The Labor Code
gives the works council the right to appoint one-third" of the members of the
Supervisory Board from among its own members.' 8 This means that such
representatives will be employees of the firm and will be representing fellow
employees and not the union.' 9 While such board members have the same
rights and obligations as those members of the board who represent share-
holders, there is one important difference: in electing the chairman of the
board or his deputy, such chairman must be elected not only by a majority of
the board, but also by a majority of the shareholder members.80
"FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, NEW LABOUR CODE 21-22.
"Austrian businesses affected by the Labor Code are of three kinds: the joint stock company
(Aktiengesellschaft, or AG); the limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschrdnkter Haf-
lung or GmbH); and the cooperative society.
"KASTNER, CORPORATION LAW, F.
"It is interesting to compare the German Codetermination Law which provides for one-half
board membership by employees' representatives. The Austrian law is modelled to some extent
on the German law, and Austrian labor leaders anticipate that employee representation on the
Supervisory Board eventually will be one-half.
"ArbVG § 110.
"This is, of course, a theoretical nicety; as will be seen, the unions exert considerable influence
on employee representation on the board.
*
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Any two or more workers' representatives on the board may demand at
any time a report on company affairs, including the relationship of the firm
with any other firm with which it is linked."1
In limited liability companies, the provision concerning worker representa-
tives on the board applies only if the firm employs more than 300 people, or,
in the case of cooperative societies, if the society employs more than forty
people.
These rulings have in the past been the subject matter of major controversy but they
now represent a considerable increase in the degree of worker participation in Aus-
trian companies. Previously there had only been provision for two representatives
of the works council to belong to a joint stock company board and no provision was
made at all in the case of other types of companies. Austrian trade unions do not
seek worker participation in the companies' managing boards. '2
The rights of the works council have been extended to such a degree that in practice,
it becomes vital for the employer to work towards effective cooperation. The law
allows the workers' representatives to exert their influence in such a variety of
individual fields that little progress would be made in a firm where there were
constant differences between labour representatives and management.
Yet the far reaching opportunities which present themselves to the workers' repre-
sentatives and the consequent necessity for cooperation between labour and
management do not mean that the works council enjoys privileges only. It also has
obligations. Its right to co-determination also represents a major responsibility, a
responsibility not just towards the employees who have elected the councils and
whose interests it represents. 3 (Emphasis added above.)
C. Interaction between the Unions and the
Works Councils
There are, then, two streams provided by the Austrian system for partici-
pation by workers. One of these is provided by the unions"' which have the
exclusive right to bargain collectively for wage agreements. These are gener-
ally concluded industrywide and, although subordinate trade union bodies
may also conduct wage negotiations, only the appropriate Trade Union, as
authorized by the Federation, may sign them. 5 Thus, while elections and
information flow may provide input from the lower levels upward, actual
bargaining and the final authority remain at a broader, national level.
The works council system, on the other hand, provides a structure for
worker participation within an individual company. The council's activities,




84Rudolf Strasser, the draftsman of the Labor Code, pointed out, in an interview in Linz (June
1976) that "the unions" should properly be understood to be only one union.
" Suppanz, supra note 7 at II.
"Works councils may begin wage negotiations within an individual firm at the base level
established by union collective agreement, but they may not go below that level.
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that of the unions. However, it should be clear that there is close cooperation
between the unions and the works councils. In practice and under rights
granted by the Labor Code, the unions maintain considerable impact on the
formation and operation of the works councils, and there is no question that
the works councils are an effective form of union representation within the
individual firm.
It is almost always the case that the people elected to the works council are
union members. When they are elected to the works council they automati-
cally, under the statutes of the Trade Union Federation, become the main
representatives in that firm of their particular union. "This means in practi-
cal terms that the elections to the works councils form the initial stage in the
system of indirect elections which lead via local, regional and provincial
levels to the appointment of senior officials at a national level." 87
If a works council has not been elected in a particular firm, the union may,
in certain circumstances, arrange for a works assembly in order to elect such a
council.88
The Labor Code allows works councils to invite union officials to partici-
pate in any of their deliberations and, with notice to the employer, access to
the premises is guaranteed. This right, at the invitation of the works council,
extends to the council's regular meetings with management, and the Code
further provides that workers' representatives should have full approval of
their unions in the conduct of their affairs.89
In their task of workers' interest representation, the staff officers [works council]
should act in harmony with the Workers' Chambers [Chamber of Labor] and the
trade unions. It is clearly expressed in the law, however, that the dispositions of the
new Labour Constitution Law [the Labor Code] should finally lead up to an adjust-
ment of the interestsfor the benefit of the workers and the enterprise; therefore, it is
essential that the employer and the staff council should cooperate." (Emphasis
added.)
D. Other Participatory Arrangements
In addition to providing the "social partnership" framework discussed
thus far, social legislation provides an additional channel for employee par-
ticipation. Also, to a limited extent, participatory arrangements such as
profit-sharing plans, also exist. It is not the purpose of this article to examine
extensively social legislation and profit-sharing plans in Austria, but they will
be noted briefly here in order to provide a context for understanding em-
ployee participation in general.
"FEDERAL PRESS SERVICE, NEW LABOUR CODE 18.
88ld.
"Id. at 17.
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1. SociAL LEGISLATION
Working hours. The Working Hours Law" established (as of 1975) a nor-
mal work week of forty hours. Overtime work is limited to five hours per
week and sixty hours per year with extra pay provisions for overtime and
night work. A Shop Closing-hour Law' 2 and additional provincial ordi-
nances regulate the business hours of retail shops.
Holidays and Vacations. A Workers' Vacation Law 3 provides for full pay
for three legal holidays and all Sundays, and by agreement between the Trade
Union Federation and the Chamber of Commerce, workers and clerks are
entitled to paid vacations in accordance with a specified schedule. Collective
and plant level agreements also usually provide for vacation and Christmas
bonuses.
Social Costs. Employers in Austria must estimate social costs at about
seventy-five percent of payroll. Social costs include: vacation and Christmas
bonuses, paid vacations, sick leave, voluntary social expenses, employer con-
tributions to social security insurance and family burdens' equalization funds
and a payroll tax.'
All employees (workers and clerksi are covered by compulsory social insurance
(old-age, disability, unemployment, health and accident). Further benefits are
granted by family and housing subsidies. Both social insurance and benefits are
financed mainly by employers and employees. 5
Pensions. The General Social Insurance Law'6 regulates social insurance
pensions, but large private concerns, including all banking and insurance
companies, provide private pensions in addition to, or sometimes indepen-
dent of those provided by law.
The usual pension level amounts to eighty percent of pay conditioned on
thirty to forty years of service. Pensions are usually granted as old-age pen-
sions for retirees above a certain age, as temporary or permanent disability
pensions or as pensions to widows and orphans. There are usually additional
pension amounts paid for dependent children.
Workers normally do not contribute to plant pension funds or, if they do, only pay
insignificant amounts. As a rule, pension payments by the firms are strictly volun-
tary, so that they can be revoked any time. In addition, pension commitments exist,
and also employees with higher standing may have contractual rights to pensions.
Outside insurance companies are normally not utilised in the pension field."'
2. PROFIT SHARING PLANS
Profit sharing plans in various forms are of growing interest in all devel-
"KoTmNOCH & SCHOENSTEIN, supra note 38, at A-12 n.55 (Tax Management Portfolio No.
222-4, 1977).
":Id. at A-12 n.56.
"Id. at A-12 n.57.
'1d.at A-12.
"sId.
"Id. at A-12 n.59.
"Id. at A-12.
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oped countries, particularly in those which, like Austria, are developing a
prices and incomes policy. 98 To date, no such plan is in widespread use in
Austria, but that is not to say that there is no interest on the part of the unions
or employers. 99
An analysis of negotiated participatory plans' 0 shows that such plans may
take the form of wages in excess of a base wage, either as a deferred wage or as
direct wages based on either a share of profits already earned by the en-
terprise or on a system of calculating the worker's individual contribution to
those profits. Or, it may be in the form of shares of investment capital re-
turned to the enterprise. Another form is as participation in a retirement fund
or as control of a severance pay fund paid for by the enterprise. Such plans
may be legislatively designated, negotiated for by unions or works councils,
or they may be initiated by the enterprise itself.'0 ' In Yugoslavia, for exam-
ple, wages have been determined solely as shares of the profits in some en-
terprises since 1961, with works councils determining the share to be paid as
wages and the share to be returned to capital.'0 2
No systematic plan along any of these lines as yet exists in Austria, al-
though some firms have experimented with profit sharing in the form of
additional wages calculated either as shares of profits or as return for worker
input. In addition, there has been some pressure on the part of the Trade
Union Federation to establish control by the union of the severance pay funds
which are statutorily required of all enterprises.' 3
According to an OECD Report of a Management Seminar, despite the
recognition of the value of workers having "some financial stake" in the
enterprise, there is strong opposition to vesting a substantial degree of owner-
ship in a central fund which, in effect, comes under the control of the trade
unions.' 4 One employer"' who reported on his attempt to develop a profit
sharing plan in his business found that employees were resistant to participa-
tion in a plan which involved a division of profits between wages and a return
into the enterprise. Further, he indicated that as the interests of workers and
management came closer to each other through increased worker participa-
"ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WORKERS' NEGOTIATED
SAVINGS PLANS FOR CAPITAL FORMATION, REGIONAL TRADE UNION SEMINAR, FLORENCE, 23RD-
24TH MAY, 1967 at 7 (1970) [hereinafter, WORKERS' NEGOTIATED SAVINGS PLANS].
"ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, JOINT WORKING PARTY ON
INTERNAL INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT, WORKERS PARTICIPATION SEMINAR, 5TH-8TH MARCH,
1975 at 4.
'"WORKERS' NEGOTIATED SAVINGS PLANS, note 98 supra.
"'WORKERS' NEGOTIATED SAVINGS PLANS 9-12, note 98 supra.
e"H. WACHTEL, WORKERS' MANAGEMENT AND WORKERS' WAGES IN YUGOSLAVIA, 99 (1973).
"'Interview with Tom Lachs, Finance Director, Konsum, in Vienna (June 1976).
"'ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, JOINT WORKING PARTY
ON INTERNAL INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT, WORKERS' PARTICIPATING MANAGEMENT SEMINAR,
5TH-8TH MARCH, 1975 at 12.
"'Interview with Richard Lehrner, Herz Armaturen, AG, in Vienna (June 1976).
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tion in such a plan, there was an undesirable blurring of the legitimately
separate interests of both sides.
It is at this point that one comes uncomfortably close to the ideological
strength and weakness of the entire concept of worker participation. In order
to satisfy everyone, worker participation must allow the two sides to come
close enough together to allow for social efficiency and yet must keep the two
sides far enough apart to allow for separate social identity.
E. Overview
Social partnership in Austria has the following distinctive features:
1. It provides for two separate channels for employee participation. On a
broad, industrywide level, primarily in the area of wages, the unions
negotiate within a context of national policy planning. At the level of
the individual company, through the works council directly and
through the union indirectly, other negotiations take place, thus pro-
viding for more direct employee participation.
2. It provides for employee participation by an elective process within the
individual firm and creates in the employee representatives selected a
legal responsibility to the employees of that firm and not to the union.
Union participation is only by invitation by the works council.
3. It provides that, as firm size increases, the employee representatives
may be increasingly released from employment duties to take on spe-
cialized functions as employee representatives.
4. It provides for an extensive support structure in the form of training
programs for employee representatives (run by the Chambers of Labor
and by the unions) to make the representatives more knowledgeable
about industrial and economic matters.
5. It provides that employee representatives on a board of directors are
themselves employees of that firm and not outsiders, and have a respon-
sibility to represent the interests of the employees who elected them, and
not to the unions of which they may be members.
III. Analysis
By all accounts, the Austrian system must be regarded as successful. Mur-
ray Edelman, writing in 1954 of the early development in Austria of a prices
and incomes policy-making system, described its goals:
... all economic sectors and all political groups seeking to win their support had
some very strong objectives in common: (1) reconstruction and improvement of
productive facilities; (2) securing foreign economic aid for this purpose and also
maintenance of at least a subsistence standard of living for the entire Austrian
population; (3) the prevention of runaway inflation; (4) minimal support for those
in greatest economic need, including at various periods, pensioners, the lowest paid
wage earners, and farmers. ' 6
'I'M. EDELMAN, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 21 (1954).
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A. Economic Data
To what extent has Austria reached those goals? By 1967, the OECD,
reporting on manpower problems in Europe, stated that during the postwar
period, the Austrian growth rate had become the highest of all OECD coun-
tries" 7 and at the same time included full employment.' 8
As the Austrian competitive position in world markets is of fundamental impor-
tance for employment, the government has won the cooperation of the central labor
and management organisation in efforts to avoid over-rapid wage and price in-
creases following high employment levels. 0
The OECD, in its Economic Survey of Austria for 1971 suggested that
Austria had been spared "stagflation" as experienced by the other OECD
members:'
The orientation of monetary and fiscal policies appears to have been somewhat
more expansionary during the last upswing than in earlier periods, reflecting the
high priority the authorities attach to economic growth and rather successful opera-
tion of price/income policies within the framework of the 'Parity Commission.'
During the 1969-1971 period, when many other countries were characterised by
'stagflation', Austria maintained full employment throughout and did not expe-
rience any dramatic acceleration of prices.'''
Furthermore, union restraint was supported by government policy on tax
rates, customs tariffs, timing of price increases, trade liberalization and
schilling revaluation."
The report said in summary: "Given the present strength of the Austrian
economy, and assuming further improvements in policy making, its perfor-
mance should be better in the 1970s than in the 1960s."1"13
For an evaluation of the more recent economic scene in Austria, the fol-
lowing material is taken from the OECD Economic Surveys for Austria for
1976 and 1977.
Recession was the story for all the OECD countries during 1974-75, but in
Austria the drop in output was considerably below the average. Furthermore,
despite a negative growth in GNP during this period, the employment level
remained remarkably stable compared with that of the 1967 recession and
relative to other OECD countries. Unemployment remained at 2.0 percent (it
had been 2.7 percent in 1967), despite an increase in the work force and a
decrease in output." 4
'
0 TThe other members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development are:
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
"'ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MANPOWER PROBLEMS IN
AUSTRIA 9 (1967).
1091d.





"' ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC SURVEY FOR
AUSTRIA 16 (1976).
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The effects of demographic developments on total labour supply were, however,
significantly dampened by a decline in both participation rates (particularly those
among women) and average working time. The shortening of the average working
week was partly a result of a 5 per cent cut in contractual working time which
became effective on 1st January, 1975, but also reflects conscious attempts by both
sides of industry (encouraged by Government) to spread the burden of a sluggish
demand evenly among the labour force by reducing overtime work." 5
An important factor in reducing excess supply in the labor market was the
drastic reduction in the foreign labor force. Work permits for foreign em-
ployees tended not to be renewed, and further recruitment of foreign workers
was discontinued, thus reducing the number of foreign workers from a quar-
terly peak of 250,000 (7.5 percent of total employment in the 4th quarter of
1973) to about 180,000 in the fourth quarter of 1975. This was countered
however by similar labor cuts in Switzerland and Germany which forced
many Austrians in those countries to return home. Return migration ac-
counted for about 15,000 added workers in 1975.116
The OECD report again cites the effectiveness of "moral suasion" as a
tool of labor policies, seeking to increase mobility in the labor market by
"improving the flow of information and job training."" 7
The Economic Survey for 1976 states in its summary:
Dependent employment remained stable and the monthly unemployment rate (sea-
sonably adjusted) never exceeded 3 per cent. At the same time progress has been
made toward lower inflation with increases in both nominal wages and consumer
prices falling below the OECD average. Despite a steep decline in merchandise
exports, the current external deficit was greatly reduced in 1975. 8
The most recent OECD Economic Survey for Austria (for 1977) reports a
quick recovery from the "relatively mild 1975 recession" and an "impres-
sive" performance of the Austrian economy in terms of real income growth,
employment and prices through 1977.'"
However, in the face of growing stress in the areas of balance of payments,
loss of foreign currency reserves, unacceptable federal deficits, and contin-
ued economic deterioration in major trading partner countries
... [Mionetary and fiscal policies have therefore been shifted towards restraining
the growth of domestic demand and imports, and with continuing weak exports,
economic growth in 1978 is likely to be modest, entailing a rise in unemployment.' 20
Unemployment in 1977 fell to a low of 1.75 percent and, despite a slight
tendency to rise since then, remains one of the lowest rates in an OECD
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Consumer prices rose by only 5.1 percent in 1977 versus 7.25 percent in
1976. 2 I
The OECD report found that an analysis of wage bargaining strategy, in
relation to the overall economy, demonstrates the success of social partner-
ship and projects a moderation of wage increases in the next round of bar-
gaining in 1978.122
B. Strikes
Another measure of the effectiveness of Austria's social partnership may
be found in the statistics concerning strikes. According to 0GB strike statis-
tics, the only strike in 1977 was a two-hour protest in which forty-three em-
ployees were involved. This means that for the entire year only eighty-six
strike hours were registered. The strike that occurred in 1977, (without per-
mission of the responsible trade union representative) was a strike by the
private employees of a Vienna taxi dispatch service and was in protest against
the dismissal of three women employees who had been employed for many
years. Following a shutdown of the business for one afternoon, the dismissal
notices were cancelled, and the conflict was settled.' 23
Major strikes in 1977 which could have had significant impact on the
Austrian economy, were averted through collective bargaining involving
220,000 metalworkers (in March) and 290,000 salaried employees in trade (in
December). In 1976, 2352 striking workers and employees were involved in a
total of 4711 strike hours. These figures represented (prior to 1977) the lowest
number since the OGB began to maintain strike statistics in 1951.124
The draftsman of the Austrian Labor Code, Rudolf Strasser, says that it is
probably the belief of most Austrians that under Austrian law the worker has
the right to strike, but he points out that in fact the Labor Code is silent as to
strikes and lockouts.
We have no legislation for these phenomena. Our Parliament keeps a neutral atti-
tude about economic weapons (A rbeitskampj). If our Parliament had the intention
to legislate these things, the provisions would be in this law. But they don't want
this.
But the real situation is that no employer would fire a worker because he has partici-
pated in a strike. It is still possible for the individual worker who goes on strike to be
brought into court for civil damages because of his individual action which breaches
his individual contract. Also, the legal situation is that he can be fired. Practically
speaking, he wouldn't be. And we have no court decisions because nobody has
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Whatever may be the fears of Austrian management concerning the politi-
cal strength of workers in Austria, it is apparently a consensus that one of the
powerful rewards this strength provides has been the absence of strikes. A
spokesman for the Chamber of Commerce stated:
What does a strike cost? Maybe millions of schillings. So I think on the other side
this system is very valuable in that we have social peace in Austria. And the unions
are not attacking the market system itself. So this is the common basis for working
together.' 2'
IV. Conclusion
"Working together" is probably the outstanding feature of the Austrian
system. Virtually every writer and every individual interviewed by this author
has remarked on the spirit of cooperativeness to be found in Austria's social
partnership. In 1972, Derek Robinson wrote, in an analysis of Austria's
prices and incomes policy:
The major contribution made by the Austrian experience is that it is possible for the
social partners to agree on a broad framework of socio-economic policies which in
turn can be the subject of discussion and consultation with government so that there
emerges a broad consensus which receives wide support at least for its main outlines
... the overriding factor is that the partners recognize the value of offsetting con-
cessionary bargaining over a wide area of social and economic policy. This is the
feature that can most profitably be imported from Austria.'27
It is not the purpose of this paper to predict the future of social partnership
in Austria, but a final word on the significance of "attitude" is in order.
Strasser says:
The system of social partnership will, in my opinion, continue to work because the
basis is a mental one (geistig); it is in the spiritual set of the Austrian people. The
Austrian is a totally other type of person from the German or Swiss or Italian,
totally other in character and in attitude. One advantage is that the Austrian is not
very eager to struggle and to bring every conflict to the highest point. He prefers not
to make conflict if it is possible to bring it to an end as soon as possible.'2
V. Postscript
It may be argued that in the United States, the adversary relationship be-
tween management and labor is too rigidly established, politically and le-
gally, to allow for useful transfer of any of the features of the Austrian
system. However, if one chooses not to be imprisoned by history, and even
better, has the capacity to learn from history, one may perhaps profitably
consider some of the elements of this system. A useful example would be the
specific issue of codetermination.
I'"Interview with Martin Mayr, Chamber of Commerce representative, in Vienna (June 1976).
'"Robinson, Evaluation of the Austrian System, in PRICES AND INCOMES POLICY, THE Aus-
TRIAN EXPERIENCE, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 63 (1972).
"'Interview with Rudolf Strasser in Linz (June 1976).
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American writers who are interested in improved labor-management rela-
tions or in corporate reform have been studying the European systems with
considerable interest. The concept of a two-tier board system which divides
the functions of management and supervisors has definite appeal to those
who see a need to interpose another layer between the shareholders and the
management of the firm. The idea of employee members on a board of direc-
tors is seen by some as a productive method for increasing the flow of infor-
mation in both directions. Although management may see precisely this
point, that is, employee access to management information, as the strongest
argument against any form of codetermination, there is a trend toward
greater participation by employees in matters that affect their working lives.
A system of codetermination is one way to arrive at what may be an inevitable
result.
The Austrian model provides a legal mechanism by which such representa-
tion may be achieved without direct union participation.
However, unlike European labor management relations which grow out of
a history of class warfare, American labor laws are a product of decisions in
favor of collective bargaining conducted at arm's length. The statutes man-
date an adversary relationship. Efforts to graft codetermination mechanisms
onto American industrial practices run head-on into the labor laws and regu-
lations, state corporation laws, and securities laws.
In addition, European-style codetermination raises problems of directors'
fiduciary duties, access of unions to corporate records outside the scope of
collective bargaining, conflicts of interest on all sides, unions' duties of repre-
sentation to their electing units, union intrusion into managerial matters and
union representatives as exclusive bargaining agents.
Solutions which have been suggested involve designating non-union mem-
bers as employee representatives, requiring employee representatives to func-
tion as full-time directors without any other employee functions, isolating
employee participation from the collective bargaining process, giving em-
ployee representatives non-voting status on the board, and providing for
employee representative selection by a process wholly separate from union
activity. However, none of these proposals is practically realistic or even
feasible under existing law in the United States.
Barring a fundamental change in American economic philosophy and mas-
sive legislative reform, it is not foreseeable that real change in the direction of
European practice is possible. Where the history and experience of nations
are so different, it is probably impossible to lift out elements of one and graft
them onto the other.
Nevertheless, some system of employee participation is becoming the way
of life in a growing number of nations, and it should be worthwhile for
American readers to become better informed about these systems. Many of
the people with whom this author spoke said that despite differences in his-
tory, some form of codetermination eventually would come to the United
States. In fact, some Austrians interviewed believed that their country's sys-
tem points the way for all industrial societies.

